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Fixing the Hole in the Ozone Layer:
A Success in the Making
Drusilla J. Hufford and Paul Horwitz
B arely two decades ago, an image obtained by the
British Antarctic Survey of the hole in the
earth's protective ozone layer generated enor-
mous public concern and heated discussion of
the science surrounding the problem. National news
magazines sported cover pictures of the hole in the ozone
layer and the issue captured the public's imagination.
Indeed polls continue to show high public awareness of,
and concern about, ozone layer depletion.
Public and scientific focus on the problem mobilized
vital policy creativity behind the idea of global coopera-
tion to reverse the damage to the ozone layer. The
resulting international accord, the Montreal Protocol on
Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, was signed by
twenty-seven countries in 1987. Montreal Protocol on
Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1522
U.N.T.S. 293, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1550 (Sept. 16,
1987) (Montreal Protocol). The treaty to protect stratos-
pheric ozone was a first-ever international collaboration
to preemptively avert a growing environmental threat
with the potential to harm people and ecological systems
worldwide.
At the international level, the accord has been high-
ly successful. It has now been signed by 187 nations,
making it the most nearly universal of treaties on the
environment. The parties to the Montreal Protocol
include both developed and developing countries, all of
whom have committed to meet real and measurable
reduction targets with quantifiable environmental goals
and milestones.
The United States has been a leader in protecting
the ozone layer, having taken substantial preventive
action even before the Montreal Protocol was negotiat-
ed. In 1978, the United States banned the use of chlo-
rofluorocarbons (CFCs) in aerosol products like con-
sumer spray cans. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,018 (Apr. 29, 1977);
43 Fed. Reg. 11,319 (Mar. 17, 1978). Since the passage
of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (CAA), the
United States has met and often exceeded targets
agreed to under the Montreal Protocol. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7661 et seq.
Ms. Hufford is director and Mr Horwitz is principal
negotiator for the Stratospheric Protection Division, US.
Environmental Protection Agency. They may be reached
at hufford.drusilla@epa.gov and horwitz.paul@epa.gov,
respectively. The views presented here are the authors'
alone and do not necessarily represent the views of EPA.
The CAA calls upon EPA to create comprehensive
domestic regulatory controls on production and con-
sumption of ozone-depleting compounds (ODCs). Over
the past ten years, these controls have been successfully
implemented to address the worst ozone depleters, slash-
ing overall U.S. production and consumption of ODCs
by more than 96 percent. A regulatory framework now
exists to ensure that ODCs still being produced and used
are carefully managed to prevent unnecessary emissions,
and to implement remaining production phase outs for
the many less potent ODCs that are still being produced.
42 U.S.C. §§ 7661 et seq. As a result of all these steps,
ozone layer protection is a success in the making.
Some point to this record of success as proof that the
problem has been solved. Regrettably, the success so far
has not ended ozone damage. The 2003 seasonal ozone
hole was, in fact, the second largest ever observed, reach-
ing 11.1 million square miles (slightly larger than the
North American continent) on September 24, 2003.
This is only slightly smaller than the largest ever record-
ed on September 10, 2000, when the ozone hole covered
11.5 million square miles. www.gsfc.nasa.gov/topstory/
2003/0925ozonehole.html.
One reason this damage continues is the very long life
of many ODCs. In addition, even though developed
countries have banned production and consumption of
the most damaging ODCs, they have not banned use of
remaining stocks or required that ODCs contained in
existing equipment be destroyed. Thus, emissions to the
atmosphere continue from ODCs that are used in-and
slowly leaking out of-millions of individual pieces of
existing equipment.
Scientists have predicted that it will be at least fifty
years before the ozone layer recovers. This estimate
assumes complete worldwide compliance with the
Montreal Protocol, including required reductions in
production for all controlled substances. During the
time it takes the ozone layer to recover, we are all liv-
ing under changed skies. Average ozone loss at midlati-
tudes, where most of the world's populations reside, are
on the order of 3 percent to 6 percent. World
Meteorological Organization, Scientific Assessment of
Ozone Depletion (2002). Because of this ozone loss,
more ultraviolet (UV) radiation will penetrate the
thinner ozone layer. This means that for some time, we
face higher lifetime risks of skin cancer and cataracts
from elevated UV levels.
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Given the strength of the scientific case supporting
action, the assumption of full compliance has been a safe
one until quite recently. However, it has proven chal-
lenging, either for economic or technical reasons, for
developed countries to completely end reliance on ODCs
in some sectors. The sound policy instincts that led
treaty negotiators to tackle the big problems first has left
some of the most intractable ones for last, proving the
economic maxim that the last few percent of any job is
the most challenging. Solving these problems cannot
rival the environmental contributions of progress already
achieved, which has led some to argue that solving these
problems does not matter to the overall effort to protect
stratospheric ozone. Nothing could be further from the
truth.
Incremental unraveling of specific protections in the
Montreal Protocol could lead to much larger erosions in
the public health gains we have made. This is because
the determination of one country
that it is not environmentally impor-
tant to comply with a small obliga-
tion that they deem in their national
circumstances difficult to complete For s
invites other countries to question
their need to comply with provisions we face h
that are difficult for them. If the
large developing countries were to
rethink their currently small ODC risks of
reduction obligations because com-
pliance is difficult, their rapidly and cat
growing economies would expand
ODC use vastly-potentially enough
to wipe out all of the global reduc- elevates
tions achieved to date. Thus, one
possible outcome of a weakening of
will to complete the job in developed
countries could be not just delay in
the recovery of the ozone layer, but a failure to restore
the ozone layer at all.
History of CFC Research
The theories of U.S. scientists Drs. Sherwood
Rowland and Mario Molina first focused scientific inter-
est on the problem of ozone depletion in the strato-
sphere. They posited the possibility that the widely used,
human-made industrial family of CFC compounds could
reach the earth's stratosphere intact because of their
molecular integrity. Mario Molina & Sherwood
Rowland, Stratospheric Sink for Chlorofluorocarbons:
Chlorine Atomic Catalyzed Destruction of Ozone, 249
NATURE 810 (1974). There, they postulated, the sun's
energy could release the chlorine atoms in CFCs, freeing
them to react with, and destroy, ozone in the earth's
stratosphere. Each single release would not merely
destroy one or a few ozone molecules, but many, as each







This hypothesis generated profound concern among
public health experts and environmentalists who under-
stood the human health and ecological stakes: the
stratospheric ozone layer shields the earth from harmful
UV radiation, making life on earth possible. If not
checked, thinning ozone could have allowed increasing
amounts of UV radiation to reach earth, causing millions
of skin cancer deaths, as well as disrupting ecological sys-
tems by damaging or killing organisms that are also intol-
erant of additional UV exposure.
The hypothesis also generated alarm among those
who viewed CFCs, which were in widespread use in such
critical areas as refrigeration, air conditioning, insulation
and industrial cleaning, as vital to national economies.
Consequently, the scientific discussion in the peer-
reviewed literature that filled in the picture sketched by
Rowland and Molina was conducted amid a chorus of
voices taking different sides of the
issue. Over time, however, scientific
evidence firmly established the
causal link between CFCs and ozone
time, depletion, leading the world commu-
nity to take specific action in the
er lifetime form of the Montreal Protocol.
The original Montreal Protocol
negotiated in 1987 represented a
n cancer modest first step, calling for a 50
percent reduction in CFC use over a
Ctsfrom decade. A second set of chemicals,
the fire-suppressant halons, was con-
Vlevels. sidered so vital that despite theirlarge contribution to ozone deple-
tion, the original parties agreed
only to freeze their production
and consumption.
The Montreal Protocol was
amended four times in succeeding years. Its subsequent
strengthening was based on a growing body of published
peer-reviewed science, including observational evidence
showing that actual damage to the ozone layer was more
severe than the mathematical models predicted. The
first change, the 1990 London Amendment, added sever-
al chemicals to the Montreal Protocol, and called for a
phase out of production and consumption of CFCs and
halons by 2000. In addition, the parties at this time cre-
ated an innovative Multilateral Fund to assist and there-
by enable full developing-country participation in the
global regime. The second change occurred in 1992,
when the parties, meeting in Copenhagen, agreed to
accelerate the phase out of CFCs even further-to 1996.
Also at that time, the parties agreed to add a newly iden-
tified ODC (methyl bromide) and to a 1994 phase out
for the highly ozone-depleting halons that just seven
years earlier had been judged to be irreplaceable.
Subsequent amendments in 1997 in Montreal, and 1999
in Beijing, strengthened the instrument in a manner
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designed to enhance compliance.
Throughout this process there was strong U.S. leader-
ship in crafting the policy architecture of the Montreal
Protocol. The first President Bush strongly pushed the
world community to go beyond the treaty's original
terms. A front-page story in the Los Angeles Times
reported, "Heeding disturbing new warnings that the
Earth's ozone layer is being destroyed at a startling pace,
President Bush called Friday for a ban on use and pro-
duction of ozone-depleting chemicals by the turn of the
century .... "Cathleen Decker & Larry B. Stammer,
Bush asks ban on CFCs to save ozone, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4,
1989, at Al. Further, President Bush made that state-
ment in an atmosphere of tremendous bipartisan support.
Once signed, the Montreal Protocol
was ratified in the U.S. Senate with-
out dissent, an occurrence virtually
unheard of today. While there was
robust debate about many details, the The Ao
amendments to the Clean Air Act
passed in 1990, making the controls
under the Montreal Protocol U.S. explicit,
It is useful to consider the factors
that contributed to this unusual level
of consensus around an environmen-
tal accord that required major
changes in industrial and consumer






agreement in the scientific commu-
nity that ODCs were destroying the
ozone layer. After spirited initial
resistance, extraordinarily broad-
based industry support for action also developed. The
strong public opinion in favor of saving the ozone layer
was a factor that helped to create this shift in perspec-
tive. Perhaps more important, some of the chemical pro-
ducers had been experimenting with alternatives to
CFCs for quite awhile. The most innovative among
them saw a way to publicly exercise environmental lead-
ership while also developing new product lines and busi-
ness opportunities.
While these factors may have served as the main
impetus to action, other aspects of the policy architec-
ture of the Montreal Protocol also helped broaden sup-
port. The Montreal Protocol was science-driven yet flex-
ible enough to incorporate some basic rules of reason,
setting against its environmental imperative important
constraints reflecting other strong interests of societies.
The treaty combined unflinching commitment to envi-
ronmental result-a 100 percent production phase out-
with a pragmatic approach to the implementation
process. For example, one rule of reason that was key in
its wide early acceptance was tackling the biggest con-
tributors to the problem first (e.g., CFCs and halons),
rather than tackling the full panoply of ODCs all at
once. Another rule of reason is reflected in the individ-
ual chemical phase outs under the treaty, which occur in
graduated reduction steps over time, giving national
economies time to adjust, implement alternatives, and
make measured transitions.
The Montreal Protocol explicitly required a periodic
review of the state of the ozone layer to ensure that as
science progressed the accord could be revised to recog-
nize new science. This review was to be conducted by an
international body of scientists who would report period-
ically on the state of the science. So that the parties
could react rapidly to changing science, the Montreal
Protocol incorporated a novel adjustment procedure that
enabled agreed-upon accelerations of controls on chemi-
cals to be legally binding in a matter of months based on
review of new scientific information.
Montreal Protocol, art. 2, 9[ 9.
Other multilateral environmental
agreements require countries to go
I Protocol back to their legislatures and seek
national ratification of such changes
before they enter into force-a
quired a process that can take years.
Another significant attribute in
view of the Montreal Protocol is its ability
to take into account the technical
of the feasibility of replacing ODCs with
alternatives. Recognizing the possi-
bility that there might be some very
7yer important uses for which alternatives
did not exist by the phase out date,
the Protocol included important
safety valves in the form of exemp-
tions from the production phase outs
for uses deemed by parties to be "essential." Montreal
Protocol, art. 2. This allowed parties to move forward
more confidently with a goal of 100 percent production
phase outs, knowing that the Protocol provided for the
possibility that some replacement tasks would be harder
than others because of the high value to society of the
use being replaced, unusual technical demands of certain
uses, or important public health issues.
A further rule of reason in the Montreal Protocol is
the freedom accorded individual country signatories to
meet the targets to which all parties agree. The treaty
sets broad goals, like an agreed-upon timetable for cuts in
production and consumption by specific dates, but leaves
individual countries to decide how best to meet these
goals. Experience has proven the wisdom of this
approach, as different countries have used different
strategies with success.
Finally, staging the developed country phase-outs first
allowed for amassing extraordinary technical experience
in making the transition in key sectors that could then
be shared with the developing world. This tactic of
including, but delaying, developing country compliance
has been key to the broad-based participation of develop-
ing countries in the process. Once the Multilateral Fund
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was set up to provide financial assistance, nearly all
developing countries signed onto strict measurable con-
trol provisions that followed the developed country lead
by, in most cases, ten years.
Successes So Far
During the run-up to the phase out of CFCs in 1996,
the United States consistently outperformed the required
levels of reduction for Class I ODCs. Similarly, for other
production phase outs, the U.S. has outperformed the
production targets of the Montreal Protocol in the
majority of control years. Success can also be measured
in other ways: Health benefits of protecting the ozone
layer are of a magnitude seldom seen in environmental
programs. Studies required by the CAA to evaluate the
protections and cost-effectiveness of its programs suggest
that we are getting more health ben-
efits through the ODC-reduction
program than just about any other
CAA requirement. Ending damage
to the ozone layer is expected to pre- Ending
vent millions of deaths from skin
cancer over the next hundred years
or so. This is an enormous benefit in the ozone
combating a disease that kills one
American every hour. to prev
Further, those health benefits
came at a lower cost than originally deaths from sA
thought possible. EPA expected the
original Montreal Protocol to deliver
a 50 percent reduction of CFCs at a next hund
cost of $3.55/kg. However, just four
years later, EPA anticipated a full
phase out of CFCs for an estimated
cost of $2.20/kg. Even when the
phase out was accelerated four years to 1996, reductions
were delivered for $2.4 5 /kg. Many factors account for
this. An important one is the difficulty of properly cap-
turing the creativity of industries responding to clear tar-
gets, which can drive costs much lower than anticipated.
Clearly, industry leadership continues its vital contribu-
tion to this record of success. WORLD RESOURCES
INSTITUTE (WRI), OZONE PROTECTION IN THE UNITED
STATES: ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS (Elizabeth Cook, ed.,
1996).
The successes achieved so far are all the more striking
when one considers how pervasive was the reliance on
the use of ODCs a little over a decade ago. Consider the
first hour of a typical day: it starts with the clock radio
alarm, components of which were cleaned with CFCs.
Beds are lofted with CFC foam; rugs cushioned with
CFC padding. Bath water is hot because of CFC foam
insulating the water heater. Downstairs a refrigerator is
cooled by CFCs, and contains CFC-blown insulating
foam. Cars on the road are air conditioned with CFCs,







with CFCs. The commute to work is made easier by
roads where white lines were laid down using methyl
chloroform. Workplaces are air conditioned by CFCs
and made safe by halon fire extinguishers; and offices are
filled with desks laminated together with carbon tetra-
chloride and with computers whose chips were cleaned
with ozone-depleting solvents. It is remarkable that
removing ODCs from all of these uses occurred with so
little disruption.
Not only have U.S. successes so far been impressive,
but progress in other developed countries has also been
enormous. Specifically, the world community as of 2002
has totally phased out the annual use of: 29,000 tons of
methyl chloroform (a solvent used by thousands of busi-
nesses), 140,000 tons of carbon tetrachloride (another
solvent with thousands of users), 110,000 tons of halons,
and finally, 710,000 tons of CFCs. While there are some
outliers, developing countries are
also doing very well. Although at
present developing countries are
only required to have frozen their
mage to consumption of ODCs at historic
levels, many are exceeding their ini-
tial freeze targets by a substantial
- is expected level. With the assistance of the
Multilateral Fund, most have
illions of reduced their historic consumption
levels by 50 percent.
ancer over the
Critical Success Factors
years or so. The policy framework created by
the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990 is among the most vital factors
in the success to date of the U.S.
effort to protect stratospheric ozone.
The policy framework relies on a carrot-and-stick
approach combining incentives and disincentives into a
robust substitute for prescriptive command-and-control
regulation. The first element in this framework was
turning off the production tap. This element envisioned
the end, in a practical and verifiable way, of the actual
cause of damage to the ozone layer. Empirical evidence
of the success of this approach was provided by a precipi-
tous decline in atmospheric amounts of methyl chloro-
form, a short-lived ozone-depleting compound. S.
Montzka et al., Present and Future Trends in the
Atmospheric Burden of Ozone Depleting Halogens, 298
NATURE 690 (Apr. 22, 1999). If the short-lived methyl
chloroform is already showing a steep decline, it is likely
that longer-lived ODCs will also decline, although over a
longer time period.
Controlling production is an "upstream" regulatory
approach, allowing EPA to develop regulations to control
the activities of a small number of chemical producers
and importers. This sharply limited set of control targets
for regulation and compliance assurance has made it pos-
sible to implement the program to date with a tiny
investment of taxpayer resources.
The framework has also been effective in its broader
operation in the economy. Reducing supply made prices
rise, which provided an incentive for producers to invest
in developing alternatives at the same time that buyers
experienced a price-based incentive to adopt those alter-
natives. Congress, recognizing that restricting supply
alone might not lead to the most expeditious phase out,
created an additional impetus in the form of a tax on
most Class I ODCs. The tax was responsible for more
than tripling the price of CFCs over what it would have
been with supply restrictions alone. WRI, OZONE
PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: ELEMENTS OF
SUCCESS.
In brief, the CAA transformed the major reduction
requirements of the Montreal Protocol into U.S. law,
mainly to be implemented by EPA. At the broadest
level, the CAA sets out a hybrid system that combines
an end of U.S. production for ODCs with interim
reduction milestones. It is a hybrid system because it
also includes other mechanisms, including requirements
for recycling, for managing essential uses, for identify-
ing and listing acceptable alternatives, and for ending
nonessential uses. The more than ninety ODCs con-
trolled by the Montreal Protocol are grouped into two
classes according to their intrinsic propensity to damage
the ozone layer. Class I ODCs include the most potent
ozone-depleting compounds, like the CFCs and the
halons. Class II includes the hydrochlorfluorocarbons
(HCFCs), a group of chemicals created specifically as
less-ozone-depleting transitional substitutes for the
Class I compounds. The Class II ODCs have their own,
later, phase out dates.
The 1990 reauthorization of the CAA served as a
forum for discussion and an impetus to action. The rapid
growth of scientific knowledge and the gathering sense of
crisis that accompanied it led to strong support to plan
for chemicals that might yet be discovered, and that
might prove to be major sources of ozone layer damage.
To address this problem, the CAA requires that EPA list
and phase out within seven years any chemical newly
identified as a significant ozone depleter, without excep-
tion or exemption. 42 U.S.C. § 767la(d). This provi-
sion had significant merits, especially given the ever
more alarming evidence of ozone depletion at the time of
passage. At the same time, it introduced rigidity into a
process characterized in many other ways by reasonable-
ness and balance; the provision includes no mechanism
to allow consideration of the feasibility in specific cases
of achieving the seven-year schedule, or of any alterna-
tive measures that might be applied. This precautionary
"kicker" clause required EPA, in the early 1990s, to add
the agricultural fumigant methyl bromide to the U.S.
schedule for phase out, and to set its initial phase out
date for 2001.
CAA requirements also provide incentives to careful-
ly use, recycle, service, and manage existing stocks of
materials. These requirements control use of CFCs and
halons by requiring recycling and other forms of special-
ized handling, all aimed at delaying the emission of these
compounds to the ozone layer. Congress also directed
EPA to identify and ban nonessential uses, so that ODCs
used in less crucial applications, for example as propel-
lants in party favors, could be replaced with safe alterna-
tives more quickly. 42 U.S.C. § 7671i.
EPA also provided consumers with better information
by requiring the labeling of products made with or con-
taining substances that damage the ozone layer. 42
U.S.C. § 7671j. Given public concern about this issue,
this information reduced demand for labeled products,
making room for alternatives. While highly controver-
sial at the time, the labeling requirement was responsible
for some of the most rapid and sweeping changes in
industrial practice that occurred in the implementation
of ozone layer protections in the United States.
The CAA also required EPA to undertake an aggres-
sive program of identifying, listing, and evaluating alter-
natives to ensure the availability of a clearinghouse of
viable, safer options. 42 U.S.C. § 7671k. Under the
Significant New Alternatives Policy (SNAP) program,
manufacturers introducing substitutes for ODCs into
interstate commerce must notify EPA of their intent to
do so ninety days before introduction. This gives EPA a
brief period to evaluate the alternative relative to other
options available for the same application and create, if
necessary, the information required to support an unac-
ceptability determination to prevent the product's intro-
duction. In fact, very few substitutes have been listed as
unacceptable. EPA has identified and listed more than
four hundred acceptable substitutes for the ODCs and
has, at the same time, prevented the introduction of a
few chemicals that would have created unacceptable
environmental and safety risks.
Crucial demand-side leadership came from a vibrant
interagency partnership between EPA and the
Department of Defense (DOD). DOD was among the
largest users of ODCs prior to 1992, requiring their use
in a variety of highly technical applications. DOD's
leadership was vital in ending widespread reliance on
ODCs within a large sector of the economy. Given the
national security concerns within their purview, DOD's
leadership is particularly outstanding in actively stimulat-
ing the transition to ozone-safe production by changing
military procurement specifications to require purchase
of items made without ODCs.
Five Remaining Challenges
EPA is now focused on meeting five substantial
remaining challenges in realizing the health and envi-
ronmental benefits of ozone layer protection. First, EPA
is working to consolidate gains in sectors where produc-
tion of the more highly depleting Class I ODCs has
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ceased, but because of existing stocks of ODCs, much of
sector transition lies ahead. An example is large build-
ing air conditioners or chillers, where transition out of
CFCs has proceeded more slowly than anticipated.
EPA's second challenge is completing the phase out of
Class II hydrofluorocarbons (HCFCs), the transitional
compounds that were created as substitutes for major
uses of the CFCs. The first of these to complete its
phase out, HCFC-141b, was selected first by both indus-
try and EPA for phase out in 2001 because of all the
HCFCs, HCFC-141b is the most damaging to the ozone
layer. Given the enormous reliance, particularly in the
refrigeration sector, on the Class II transitional chemi-
cals, much work remains to meet required reduction
steps for phasing out production of the remaining Class
II chemicals.
A third challenge arises because
"ending production" of CFCs does
not imply a 100 percent phase out. The existent
Because the Protocol included the
essential use exemption, about 1,700
tons of CFCs continue to be pro- for vital uses
duced for use in the United States
every year. This goes almost exclu- sustaining t,
sively for hand-held, metered-dose
inhalers that 16 million U.S. asthma
patients rely on daily. The exis- governm
tence of a safety valve for vital uses
was important to sustaining the overall
resolve among governments to agree
to the overall controls on the Montr,
Montreal Protocol, and the amounts
that have been allowed through this
mechanism are less than 1 percent
of the original amounts of CFC use-the 1986 baseline
quantities.
This essential use exemption has proven to be very
effective. During the last decade, it has provided phar-
maceutical companies with adequate time to solve the
complex technical problems associated with finding
effective alternatives, while also spurring innovation in
delivery techniques and treatment approaches that may
yield additional benefits to patients. As a consequence,
the use of CFCs in this application has been reduced by
more than 80 percent from EPA's initial requests for
exemptions. While this residual use may seem small,
medical progress tends to set standards that ultimately
translate into a one-world standard of care. A failure to
phase out this residual use in developed countries could
mean that asthmatics in China and India may also
require CFC-based inhalers in the future. The aggregate
impact of this residual use could significantly delay
recovery of the ozone layer. Thus, EPA's third challenge
involves a careful and balanced conclusion to the essen-
tial use program, one that is respectful both of the
claims of patients and of the need to foster worldwide








EPA's fourth challenge is managing the phase out of
the final Class I chemical, methyl bromide (MeBr).
MeBr is among the most widely used agricultural fumi-
gants, with the United States using, as of 1996, nearly
40 percent of all MeBr produced in the world. It is pri-
marily used to prepare soils for planting, and is injected
in gaseous form deep into planting areas that are often
covered with tarps to enhance its effectiveness by
retaining the gas as long as possible in the soil. MeBr is
a well-understood chemical in commercial agriculture,
and has proven its value over the past forty years as a
broad-spectrum pest control tool. Because of its toxici-
ty, it is a highly effective general biocide. Its spectrum
of activity is very wide, virtually sterilizing the soil
prior to the introduction of the desired crop.
When the CAA provisions on ozone layer protection
were negotiated in 1990, MeBr was
not known to deplete ozone.
a safety valve Shortly after 1990, MeBr began to
attract scientific interest and it rap-
idly became clear that MeBr was in
important to fact highly ozone-depleting. Thus it
became subject to the kicker clause
• solve among in the 1990 CAA, which required
EPA to list it as a Class I ozone-
depleting compound and to phase it
out of domestic production by 2001.
The CAA's kicker clause left no
ols on the room for exception or exemption
from this 2001 phase out, nor did it
3rotocol. provide for any interim reductions
that, in the case of other ODCs,
were so useful in creating the mar-
ket signals that stimulated move-
ment to alternatives. When EPA listed MeBr in 1992,
no other developed country under the Montreal
Protocol had any similar domestic requirement, making
the United States the only country controlling this
compound.
For environmental reasons, and to level the playing
field with key agricultural competitors, the United States
in 1992 urged the Montreal Protocol parties to add MeBr
to the Montreal Protocol, which they reluctantly did.
Although the United States worked hard to convince
other countries to agree to a phase out for MeBr in 2001,
matching U.S. law, the parties in 1992 only agreed to a
1995 freeze in MeBr production, a movement toward the
U.S. position that was further strengthened in 1995. In
1997, the United States was able to secure an agreement
from developed countries to advance the MeBr phase out
to 2005, and from developing countries to a phase out in
2015. Recognizing the difficulty of meeting the 2001
CAA deadline, Congress, with administration support,
amended the CAA to harmonize with the Montreal
Protocol, adopting the same control schedule for the
United States that all other developed countries face
under the treaty.
These changes to the CAA shifted the United States
MeBr phase out from 2001 to 2005, and allowed for a
gradual reduction in production over time. It also incor-
porated into U.S. law the three exemptions for MeBr
that had been created by the Montreal Protocol: (1) an
exemption for quarantine uses vital to trade in agricul-
ture, commodities, and durable goods that may harbor
pests; (2) an emergency use exemption; and (3) an
exemption for critical uses, allowing for continued pro-
duction and consumption of MeBr after 2005 for critical
uses that all parties agree have no economically or tech-
nically feasible alternatives.
EPA is now in the process of working to ensure con-
tinuing availability of MeBr for those U.S. uses for which
growers have no technically and economically feasible
alternatives. Despite the tremendous efforts to date, the
extension of the original CAA deadlines, and the fact
that many other developed countries
have virtually phased out of MeBr,
the United States continues to face
significant challenges in phasing out
MeBr. Recognizing this, the United
States has sought to use the critical- Of the challe7
use exemption to a greater degree
than was ever necessary in the case the most imp
of the essential use exemption for
CFCs. This has proven to be both that devek
controversial and challenging at the
international level. It is difficult for
some countries to understand both comply with
the size of U.S. requests (over 35
percent of baseline levels in the first under the M
two years requested, 2005 and 2006),
and the reason why alternatives that
may be efficacious in their context
may not be feasible in the United
States.
Of the challenges that remain, however, the fifth and
final is the most important, and that is assuring that
developing countries comply with their obligations under
the Montreal Protocol. EPA's primary efforts have been
through the Multilateral Fund, through promoting trans-
fer of reliable technologies to facilitate the transition,
and by working through the international process to
emphasize the importance of compliance with require-
ments already agreed to by all parties. Because develop-
ing countries have yet to make the transition away from
chemicals responsible for ozone layer damage, it is vital
to maintain their commitment to the Montreal Protocol.
If developing countries fail to follow through, their con-
tinuing use of ODCs could end the world's progress
toward ozone layer recovery.
MeBr is a clear case where the developing world is
watching closely as the developed world concludes its
own transition. The developing-country phase out is
still at its initial stages; these countries have most of






prisingly, they have looked to the experience of the
developed world for technical support, for financial assis-
tance, and the practical know-how needed to prepare for
their own transitions. As they observe the end of the
transition to ozone-safe chemicals in the developed
world, they will note any weaknesses in the developed
world's resolve. Any lack of effort on our part to fulfill
related obligations could lead developing countries to
question their need to comply with the components of
the Montreal Protocol they perceive as difficult in their
own national settings. Our success or failure will influ-
ence this process.
Challenges of the Endgame
EPA faces significant difficulties in meeting these five
remaining challenges to ozone layer protection. The
basic reason is that many of the con-
ditions that favored our success in
the program's early days no longer
obtain. For example, in the past it
was conventional wisdom in the
that remain, United States that global collabora-
tion would be important in solving
nt is assuring global environmental problems; now
it is more common to view global
g countries efforts with skepticism. For good
reasons, concerns about homeland
security, national sovereignty, and
r obligations international competitiveness are far
more resonant than fostering inter-
real Protocol. national cooperation to solve global
environmental problems.
Similarly, the program in early
years enjoyed the support of many
large vested interests. Many compa-
nies either had a neutral financial interest or a positive
stake in supporting the phase out, based on the expecta-
tion of selling alternatives in a post-ODC world market.
By contrast, the economic interests that face remaining
phase outs in some cases represent pockets of highly
focused resistance, where some key companies and sec-
tors have delayed implementing ozone-safe alternatives.
Among producers, the reduced expectation associated
with successive transitions has made investment in alter-
natives much less attractive. Also at the program's
inception, it was critical to support the phase outs in
countries with highly developed regulatory structures,
and highly technical manufacturing and business infra-
structures. Remaining challenges lie in countries with
emerging regulatory structures, where the assistance of
the Multilateral Fund is often the only major incentive
favoring change.
To understand how these new conditions influence
future progress, it may be useful to consider again the
example of methyl bromide, where the U.S. transition is
(contnued on page 72)
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